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Even at the turn of the millennium analysis of the historical development of 
political institutions is important for understanding the nature of certain 
mechanisms of modern politics. The outcome of the crisis of democracy in 
Germany and Austria under the Third Reich (from 1933 in Germany and 
from 1938 in Austria following the Anschluss) marked a sharp change in the 
political systems in both countries and, in a foreign policy perspective, for 
all of central Europe. In the mid-1930s Czechoslovakia was the only state 
left in Central and Eastern Europe that, despite the economic crisis, had
preserved its democratic structures. Developments in Germany, however, 
had fatal consequences for Czechoslovakia, culminating in the Munich 
Agreement in 1938 and the end of the country’s independence. This paper 
addresses several interrelated questions. What led to the demise of democ-
racy in the Weimar Republic and Austria? What weakened democratic insti-
tutions in these two central European states in the early 1930s? Can we find 
similar or different features in political developments in Germany and Aus-
tria? To find answers to these questions we will examine not just constitu-
tional institutions and their weakness but also the forces operating against 
republican regimes. 
The crisis in democracy in the early 1930s is a good example of er-
rors of the past and the lessons that can be drawn from them. In the long-
term perspective of 20th-century history we can assess the democratic de-
velopment in West Germany and Austria after the Second World War as 
essentially positive. Political relations in Germany and Austria after 1945 
are, partly in response to pressure from the victorious powers today inter-
preted in contrast to the period 1933–1945. Although current constitutional 
practices in Austria and Germany derive mainly from the democratic period 
after the Second World War, we can also trace the roots of current devel-
opment back to the years after the First World War. Looking closely at the 
lessons to be had from the crisis of democracy in the interwar period helped 
the re-establishment and re-design of institutions in Germany and Austria 
towards buttressing a pluralist political system. In 1949 West Germany 
adopted the ‘Basic Law’ (Grundgesetz), which put the constitutional and 
political system on new foundations. The Basic Law was influenced by the 
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crisis of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi rise to power in 1933. West 
Germany began to develop a new identity after the fall of Nazism, one 
based on the idea of European cooperation1 and respect for the democratic 
principles anchored in the Basic Law (Verfassungspatriotismus). Immedi-
ately after the end of the war in 1945 Austria re-instated its Constitution 
from 1920 (in the amended reading from 1929), which still applies today 
and is evidence of the continuity of Austrian constitutional law. After the 
Second World War, Austria embarked on a gradual path towards its own 
national identity, distinct from the German nation.2 The main political 
camps in Austria bore in mind the need to avoid a repetition of the civil war 
of 12 February 1934 between social democrats and the conservative Catho-
lic camp (represented after 1945 by ÖVP) and to seek out cooperation. A 
positive sign of consensus was the repeat formation of large coalition gov-
ernments between the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ)3 and the Austria 
People’s Party (ÖVP), a coalition that has currently been in power since the 
elections in 2008.
Both interwar Austria and the Weimar Republic got rid of the repub-
lican system at the start of the 1930s. Here we will compare the First Aus-
trian Republic (1918–1934/38) and the Weimar Republic (1918–1933) with 
respect to their constitutional development, practical policies, and the causes 
and consequences of steps taken by individual political actors. In Germany 
the weaknesses and crisis of Weimar served as a typical example of the dis-
tortion of the constitutional pluralist system.4 The distortion was caused by 
factors such as political polarisation, the rise of undemocratic parties, the 
instability of Weimar governments, a presidential office with too much 
power and an anti-democratic political culture. Those led to authoritarian 
‘presidential regime’ in 1930–1933 and the political rise of the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), culminating in the appointment 
of Adolf Hitler as German chancellor. Finally, the economic crisis that be-
gan in 1929 exacerbated social problems and contributed to the assertion of 
totalitarian solutions and parties. In Austria the situation was more compli-
cated. Conservative forces, which also embarked on an authoritarian path 
the support of the paramilitary Heimwehr movement, managed for a short 
1 W. E. PATERSON, European Policy-making: Between Associated Souvereignty and 
Semisovereignty, in: S. GREEN, W. E. PATERSON (Eds.), Governace in Contemporary 
Germany. The Semisouvereign State Revisited, Cambridge 2005, pp. 261–282 (261).
2 G. HEISS, Konsenzus a jeho cena. Konstrukce identity v Rakousku po roce 1945,
in: G. HEISS, A. MÍŠKOVÁ, J. PEŠEK et al. (Eds.), An der Bruchlinie: Österreich und 
???? ????????????????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ?? ??????????????? ??? ????,
Innsbruck, Wien 1998, pp. 369–388.
3 Since 1991 Social Democratic Party (SPÖ).
4 R. ARON, Demokracie a totalitarismus, Praha 1993, pp. 99–101.
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time to successfully challenge emergent Nazism. Developments in 1933–
1934 demonstrate this. In a long-term perspective, however, even Kurt 
Schuschnigg’s Austria in 1934–1938, weakened after the Social Democratic 
Party was knocked out of political life, was not resistant to the internal pres-
sure of the NSDAP and the foreign policy influence of Hitler’s Third Reich.
Constitutional development in Germany and Austria after 1918
Germany
The Weimar Constitution (Weimarer Reichsverfassung, WRV)5 was the 
product of compromises between the three main political powers that were 
behind the republic’s creation (“the Weimar coalition”) and had obtained an 
absolute majority in the elections to the National Assembly in January 1919 
(78% of the votes). These were the moderate Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), the Catholic Zentrum Party, and liberals from the German Demo-
cratic Party (DDP). The Constitution was adopted by the national Assembly 
on 31 July 1919. The German Reich established itself as a parliamentary 
republic. Its Constitution was based on the principles of the division of 
power, popular sovereignty, and contained a catalogue of basic rights. The 
impression was of a model democracy, but adherence to republican princi-
ples and democracy was also dependent on the given political culture and 
on the application of constitutional principles in practice (sees below).6
Legislative power in Germany lay with the Reichstag, which also 
exercised control over the executive. The Reichstag was elected in direct, 
secret-ballot, general elections in a system of proportional representation 
(Art. 17, 22 WRV). In an era of strengthening political polarisation the fact 
that the Constitution did not define political parties or their internal organi-
sation and contained no proviso that parties had to obtain a minimum num-
ber of votes in order to gain entry into Parliament (there were no constitu-
tionally set election threshold) proved to be a problem. This led on the one 
hand to the fragmentation of the political spectrum (the existence of so-
called Splitterparteien), instability, and frequent party cleavages, and on the 
other hand did nothing to prevent radical parties from getting into the 
Reichstag (e.g. the NSDAP with 2.6% of the votes) as early as the 1920s. 
The government derived its power from trust in the Reichstag, to which the 
government was accountable.7 Individual German states within the federa-
tion were represented by the Reichsrat (2nd chamber of the Parliament), 
5 ???????????????????????????????????????E. ?????, Dokumenty ke studiu moderních 
??????????????????????, Brno 1994, pp. 50–85.
6 D. MORAVCOVÁ, Výmarská republika, Praha 2006, p. 47.
7 E. KOLB, Die Weimarer Republik, München 1988, p. 19.
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which possessed the right of suspensive veto over bills passed by the 
Reichstag. Here Weimar drew on the federal relations between the Reich 
and the German states that were created during the German Empire 1871–
1918. Moreover, the main counter-power to the Reichstag was the President 
and strong powers of that office. The President was elected directly by the 
German people for a term of seven years (Articles 41 and 43 WRV). For 
conservatives, the President was a safeguard against the strength of Parlia-
ment, but the left saw elements of direct democracy in this office (e.g. Art. 
73 WRV).
According to Article 25 of the Weimar Constitution, the President 
had the right to dissolve the Reichstag. He could intervene in legislation by 
submitting a law to a referendum for approval (Art. 73 WRV). However, 
the President had key special powers defined in Article 48 of the Constitu-
tion, according to which the President could de facto independently declare 
laws and issue emergency orders with legal force (President Friedrich Ebert 
issued 42 orders in 1923). However, the potential impact of Article 48 was 
never adequately and correctly assessed by the parliamentary majority that 
adopted the Constitution in 1919.8 The reading of General Clause No. 48, 
Par. 2 WRV – “If public safety and order is disturbed or at risk, the Presi-
dent of the Reich may across the territory of the Reich adopt necessary 
measures and take proportional action with the aid of the military forces”9
– became, after 1930, when the parliamentary system was further weakened 
by presidential decisions, the gateway to the rise of a dictatorship. Deter-
mining what constituted ‘necessary measures’ was de facto left at the dis-
cretion of the President.10 The President was also authorised to temporarily 
revoke provisions contained in Articles 114 (individual freedom), 117 (the 
inviolability of the secrecy of letters, post, telegraph and telephone commu-
nication), 118 (right to freely express one’s opinions), 123 (freedom of as-
sembly), 124 (freedom to form association) and 153 (right of inheritance).
The obligation placed on the President to “inform the Reichstag immediate-
ly of the entire matter” (Art. 48, Par. 4 WRV) and the need for all presiden-
tial orders and measures to be countersigned (Art. 50 WRV) represented 
two restrictions on the power of the President, but these were gradually un-
dermined.
The increasing instability of governments and the paralysis the 
Reichstag began in spring 1930 after the end of the government of Social 
Democrat Hermann Müller. The rise of the NSDAP in the September elec-
tions in 1930 contributed to the stabilisation of a “presidential regime”, 
8 Ibidem, p. 19.
9 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????, p. XX.
10 K. D. BRACHER, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, Düsseldorf 1955, pp. 56–58.
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whose central figurehead in 1930–1933 was President Paul von Hinden-
burg.
We can refer to the Weimar Constitution as a system of political and 
social compromises that were reached between moderate representatives of 
the labour movement and the democratic wing of the civic camp.11 In this 
respect the constitutional situation in Germany much resembled that in Aus-
tria. Many basic political decisions were deferred and individual political 
and social groups were left unsatisfied by the compromise. The nobility, the 
conservatives, and a section of the civic camp rejected a republic and hoped 
for a return to the Monarchy, while the radical left and part of the SPD were 
on the contrary waiting for an inversion of the social order, which they were 
unable to push through during the changes implemented in 1918/1919.12
However, to this end, the Social Democrats, headed by F. Ebert, in order to 
secure the support of the army and the neutrality of heavy industry, reached 
an agreement with a section of the old elites during the revolution in No-
vember 1918.13 In doing so they did not take full advantage of the political 
space that was available to them at the start of the republic to assert their 
political line. 
Austria
The Constitution of the Austrian Republic was adopted after several months 
of negotiations on 1 October 1920. It was the outcome of a compromise 
between the two largest Austrian political parties, the Social Democrats and 
the Christian Social Party. Although the government coalition formed by 
these two parties had collapsed by the summer of 1920, they managed to 
maintain a consensus in the constitutional subcommittee for several months 
longer.14 The document of the Constitution was drafted by the most im-
portant Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen. It established four basic princi-
ples: republicanism, democracy, rule of law, and federalism. Legislative 
power was represented by the Nationalrat, elected in direct elections. The 
second chamber was the Bundesrat comprised of representatives of the re-
gional parliaments (Landtag) of the individual Austrian states. The Consti-
tution gave Parliament considerable powers, but there was no countervailing 
11 KOLB, p. 20.
12 For a leftwing view of the social structures in the Weimar Republic, see R. KÜHNL,
Die Weimarer Republik. Errichtung, Machtstruktur und Zerstörung einer Demokratie,
Reinbek 1985.
13 This way based on telephone conversation between F. Ebert and General Groener on 
10 November 1918 and an agreement between the head of the trade unions C. Legien 
and H. Stinnes, representative of heavy industry elites.
14 R. WALTER, H. MAYER, Grundriß des österreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts,
Wien 1996, pp. 25n.
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factor in the form of a strong executive. Political parties, clashing on the 
floor of Parliament, became the main pillar of the state order. The Austrian 
Social Democrats saw a strong Parliament as a space for asserting their in-
terests in the social sphere by democratic means. In 1922 Chancellor Ignaz 
Seipel formed a civic coalition of the Christian Social Party (Christlich-
soziale Partei) and the Greater German People’s Party (?????????????
Volkspartei), which excluded the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozi-
aldemokratische Arbeiterpartei). The Austrian government was moreover 
forced by the impact of the deteriorating economic situation and rising infla-
tion to apply for a loan to the League of Nations. On 4 October 1922 it 
signed the Geneva Protocols for the provision of international loans to stabi-
lise Austrian currency. In return Austria was required to maintain its inde-
pendence and oppose annexation by Germany. The Greater German Peo-
ple’s Party abandoned the idea of the Anschluss in the common interest of 
maintaining the political coalition. The position of the Austrian civic camp 
towards the social democrats further strengthened the alliance between 
German nationalists and the Christian Social Party. The republican Consti-
tution of 1920 was, like many other decisions, a shaky compromise. The 
civic camp and many leaders of the Heimwehr exerted strong pressure 
aimed at bringing about changes to the Constitution. Some amendments 
were made to the Constitutional Act in 1925, but extensive reform of the 
Constitution became a major theme in the Austrian political scene in 1929 
under the government of Chancellor Johannes Schober. Ignaz Seipel, as 
Chancellor of the coalition of civic parties, wanted to strengthen the position 
of the ruling coalition and the Christian Social Party by constitutionally 
strengthening the powers of the executive.15
In 1929 the system in which Parliament had had the dominant role 
was turned into a republic with a powerful President.16 The powers of the 
President were strengthened, and new powers were added: the right to issue 
emergency decrees, appoint the government, and under certain circumstanc-
es dissolve the Nationalrat. The position of the President was further 
strengthened by the introduction of direct elections of the head of state.17
Although constitutional reform was not executed in the spirit of the ideolo-
gy of the Heimwehr, which wanted to replace the parliamentary system with 
an ‘estates system’ and authoritarian government, it signified a noticeable
shift away from the ‘radical-parliamentary’ republic towards a state in 
15 K. J. SIEGFRIED, Universalismus und Faschismus. Das Gesellschaftsbild Othmar 
Spanns. Zur politischen Funktion seiner Gesellschaftslehre und Ständestaatkonzeption,
Wien 1974, p. 82.
16 W. WILTSCHEGG, Die Heimwehr. Eine unwiderstehliche Volksbewegung?, Wien 
1985, p. 307.
17 WALTER, MAYER, p. 27.
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which two opposing powers could clash with each other: the legislature 
(Parliament) and the executive (the Government and the President).18 Alt-
hough in terms of the constitutional position of the President Austria resem-
bled the semi-presidential model of the Weimar Republic, the federal Presi-
dent never became a player that in any fundamental way shaped the political 
system. The authoritarian changes of the Dollfuss Government that fol-
lowed the so called “self-ousting of Parliament” on 4 March 1933 were in-
troduced by means of Government order, the legal foundation for which 
was the contentious (but valid) “Wartime Economic Empowerment Act” 
(Kriegswirtschaftliches Ermächtigungsgesetz) of 24 July 1917.19
A Comparison of Development
The young republican systems in Germany and Austria shared certain prob-
lems. The radical right (in Germany, for instance, the NSDAP and in Aus-
tria the Heimwehr movement) and nationalistic and conservative circles
rejected the republican system and the parliamentary system as such and 
openly lobbied for an authoritarian nationalistic transformation.20 An im-
portant role was also played by the opposition to the peace treaties of Ver-
sailles (Germany was heavily burdened with reparations) and Saint-
Germain-en-Laye (forbidding Austrian annexation to Germany, i.e. the An-
schluss).21 After an initial “revolutionary” phase (1918–1922/23) and the 
period of relative stabilisation in the second half of the 1920s the constitu-
tional republic was subjected to authoritarian changes in the 1930s. In Aus-
tria the situation developed into the elimination of Parliament on 4 March 
1933, the civil war in February 1934, and the creation of the “Estates state” 
(Ständestaat), officially established with the introduction of the May Con-
stitution on 1 May 1934.22 In Germany the Weimar Constitution formally 
remained in effect until 1945. However, the spirit of the Constitution was 
already being violated by the actions of the ruling presidential cabinets in 
18 U. KLUGE, Der österreichische Ständestaat 1934–38, Enstehung und Scheitern, Wien 
1984, p. 24.
19 For a more detailed analysis, see P. HUEMER, Sektionschef Robert Hecht und die 
Zerstörung der Demokratie, in: Österreich. Eine historisch-politische Studie, München
1975.
20 In the case of the Austrian Heimwehr an example is the authoritarian demands of the 
Korneuburg Oath of 1930.
21 For more on German and Austrian foreign policy, see M. ???????, Konec 
demokracie v Rakousku 1932–193??? ??????????? ???????????? ?? ???????????? ???????? ?????
demokracie, Praha 2004, p. 21.
22 W. BRAUNEDER, F. LACHMAYER, Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte, Wien
1992, pp. 233–234; H. WOHNOUT, Anatomie einer Kanzlerdiktatur, in: H. KOPETZ,
J. MARKO, K. POIER (Hrsg.), Soziokultureller Wander im Verfassungsstaat. 
Phänomene politischer Transformation, Wien 2004, pp. 961–974 (965).
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1930–1932. The toppling of the Prussian Government in July 1932 (the 
Preussenschlag) under Chancellor Franz von Papen was an open violation 
of the Constitution. In this respect, Hitler’s being named Chancellor repre-
sented in formal terms a legal change of government, but it resulted in the 
rapid and definitive destruction of the Weimar system based on rule of law. 
The Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz), officially passed on 23 March 
1933 in the Reichstag, transferred de facto the right to issue laws to the gov-
ernment and thus also constitutionally strengthened the position of the 
emerging Nazi dictatorship.23
The Parliamentary System and Political Polarisation – the Issue of 
Democratic Stability
A chance existed to create a stable democratic system in interwar Germany 
and Austria. However, no active advantage was taken of the existing demo-
cratic potential or opportunities for cooperation between democratic forces. 
The political polarisation and growing unwillingness to accept compromises 
were caused on the one hand by general factors such as post-war instability, 
social change, economic crisis, inflation, and, last but not least, the financial 
burden presented by the terms of the peace treaties. Similar problems were 
experienced by other states, such as Czechoslovakia, where democracy sur-
vived until the Munich Agreement in 1938. In Austria and Germany an im-
portant role was moreover played by medium-term events and the specific 
constellation of internal politics that ultimately sapped the strength from 
democratic and republican forces.
The membership base of the National Workers’ Councils (Räte-
bewegung), which emerged from below in the revolution of 1918, was domi-
nated by republicans and moderate Social Democrats.24 The Government of 
F. Ebert underestimated the Rätebewegung’s significance for the stability of 
the republic in Germany and failed to take advantage of the democratic po-
tential that was in the workers’ councils, and on the contrary it unleashed 
the Freikorps, voluntary paramilitary units, to suppress the activities of “ex-
treme” left-wing radicals, such as the Spartacist uprising in January 1919 
(Spartakusbund). This trend, which became stronger after the so-called 
Kapp-Putsch25 in March 1920, further added to the political polarisation on 
23 H. MÜLLER et al., ??????????????, Praha 1995, pp. 266, 270.
24 KOLB, p. 156.
25 Kappputsch was a coup of the part of the former imperial armed forces. On Wolfgang 
Kapp’s right-wing putsch attempt, see J. ERGER, Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch. Ein Beitrag 
zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1919/20, in: Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentaris-
mus und der politischen Parteien (Hrsg.), Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus 
und der politischen Parteien, Bd. 35, Düsseldorf 1967.
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the left, shifting weight more in the direction of the USPD and later the 
Communists (KPD). The left in Germany was then divided and the SPD 
grew weak, while on the right, support was growing for the monarchic 
DNVP. In the elections in June 1920, the moderate Social Democrats and 
the DDP, the parties that formed the backbone of the “state-building” Wei-
mar coalition, together with the Zentrum Party lost their absolute majority, 
and never regained it for the duration the Weimar Republic (in the first elec-
tions in 1919 the Weimar coalition had almost about 80% of the votes). The 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) made do with the parliamentarising 
of the political system, and from the very start of the republic they party 
never strove for nor in the given political circumstances was able to assert 
any major changes, such as introducing strict democratic control over the 
military. In 1920 the republican parties suffered electoral losses from which 
they never recovered, and that left the ruling cabinets dependent on the sup-
port of the DVP (the part of the party representing heavy industry) or the 
DNVP (the conservative party supported by the nobility), which de factor 
represented the opposition in the Weimar system and stood for the interests 
of large landowners in the eastern part of Germany (Ostelbien). This was 
apparent in the economic measures that were introduced by the ruling civic 
cabinets during the relatively stable second half of the 1920s.26
There was also a right-wing alliance (the Freikorps movement, the 
Stahlhelm, a war veterans’ organisation) that agitated against the republic, 
was opposed to liberalism, and was critical of the parliamentary system. 
Anti-democratic ideas also found support among German writers of the so-
called conservative revolution (Moeller van der Bruck, Ernst Jünger, Wer-
ner Beumelburg). Like anti-democratic thinkers in Austria (Othmar Spann), 
they saw Marxism as their common enemy and rejected the civic and liberal 
ideas of the French Revolution of 1789. The political climate in Weimar 
was also fundamental influenced by the conservatively-minded state bu-
reaucracy and justice system. The republican regime was also undermined 
by the nationalistic atmosphere and displays of anti-Semitism at the univer-
sities. Even before the economic crisis many supporters of the NSDAP were 
able to obtain prominent positions in student bodies at German universi-
ties.27 Anti-liberal potential was firmly established in the Weimar Republic 
even before the rise of Nazism. Its impact was felt in the weakening of 
democratic political parties. The gradual demise and disintegration of the 
political centre (including the DNVP on the right after 1928, see below) in 
26 H. MOMMSEN, Die verspielte Freiheit, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin 1990, p. 226.
27 For more information see, M. KATER, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in 
Deutschland, 1918–1933: Eine sozialgeschichtliche Studie zur Bildungskrise in der We-
imarer Republik, Hamburg 1975.
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the Weimar Republic led to the formation of strong protest-voting potential, 
which from 1929 and then during the economic crisis was usefully mobi-
lised by Hitler’s NSDAP to its advantage.
The disintegration of the middle classes, white-collar workers, small 
business people, and intellectuals partly resulted from the financial insecuri-
ty created by the republic’s economic problems, the latent economic crisis 
(the deflationary trend after 1924) even before 1929, and reparations. In 
1923 hyperinflation stripped entire social groups (especially employees) of 
their savings.28 Also, interest groups in heavy industry29 were unhappy with 
the social order of the Weimar Republic and especially with the introduction 
of a mandatory employer contribution to unemployment insurance (from 
1927). In industrial circles they were convinced that no change in the social 
order would be possible in the given republican system, only in a regime of 
“emergency decrees”. One way of achieving this in the Weimar Republic 
was through the use of Article 48 of the Constitution permitting the for-
mation of an authoritarian government by presidential decree. Finally, from 
the late 1920s the military also had an influence on politics. In contrast to 
Hans von Seeckt, who asserted an apolitical position for the military, Kurt 
von Schleicher was a politically active general. In 1930 he was active be-
hind the scenes in helping to bring about the collapse of the grand coalition 
government of Hermann Müller with the aim of ending the Social Demo-
crats’ participation in the government. This helped to pave the way for the 
emergence of the first presidential cabinet of Chancellor H. Brüning in 
spring 1930.
In Austria the chances for democracy were slightly greater. After the 
elections in February 1919 an alliance was formed between the two main 
political camps, the Social Democrats (SDAP) and the Christian Social Par-
ty (CSP). However, the grand coalition government, headed by Social 
Democratic Karl Renner, only survived until 1920. Disputes over matters 
ranging from social issues to the economy and to religion and education hit 
at the very heart of the parties’ platforms and the two camps were unable or 
unwilling to harmonise them to create a united government policy.30 To the 
end of the First Republic Austria was never again able to return to this model
of cooperation in a grand coalition through “proportional democracy” (Ger-
hard Lehmbruch), which later proved so effective for a long time after the 
Second World War. The dividing line that cut across Austrian society and 
politics, with cities on one side and rural areas on the other, was further re-
28 G. D. FELDMAN, The Great Disorder. Politics, Economics and Society in the Great 
Inflation 1914–1924, Oxford 1993.
29 For example, Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie.
30 K. BERCHTOLD (Hrsg.), Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868–1966, München 
1967, pp. 259, 371.
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inforced by the Socialists’ governmental control over Vienna (das rote 
Wien), which formed a sharp contrast to the conservative and Catholic prov-
inces. The opposition of the old imperial elites, the bourgeoisie and the 
church to the organised labour movement was fed by the socialist campaign 
against the Catholic Church, which reached a peak in 1923 and 1927.31
After the coalition fell apart in 1920 the Christian Social Party, 
headed by Ignaz Seipel, tried to form a right-wing ‘civic’ coalition, which 
ended up as an alliance between the Christian Social Party and the Greater 
German People’s Party that survived until 1932. The coalition of civic par-
ties aimed to reverse and curtail the “revolutionary drift” that followed 
1918–1920 and the de facto socialist legislation put through by the SDAP in 
the grand coalition. The strong Social Democratic Party, which in the par-
liamentary elections in 1930 won over 41% of the vote, settled permanently 
into the opposition, but it also defended its parliamentary position in the 
state. The antagonism between the Social Democrats and the Christian So-
cial Party grew into conflicts in the 1920s. A key turning point in this re-
spect came in 1927, when, after an incident that occurred in Schattendorf 
in Burgenland, which the Austrian courts dealt with too leniently (and in 
favour of the right-wing radicals), on 15 July 1927 spontaneous rioting 
broke out among workers in Vienna. During this mass demonstration the 
palace of justice was set on fire and the Government presented the event to 
conservative citizens as an immediate Marxist threat. Within two years, 
1927–1928, even before the economic crisis, the Heimwehr, an extra-
parliamentary movement, became extraordinarily popular (the number of 
members grew by around 300,000–400,000).32 The civic camp in Austria, 
represented by the Christian Social Party, viewed the Heimwehr as a coun-
terweight to the strong Social Democrats and to the Schutzbund, the para-
military defence league of the SDAP. The Heimwehr movement was a mili-
tia that emerged after the First World War in the Austrian states (Styria, 
Carinthia, Tyrol). Geographically dispersed, the branches of the movement 
were united by their rejection of parliamentarism, their militant conduct, 
and anti-Marxism. The movement’s ideology was a mixture of an archaic 
“mediaeval” estates doctrine and modern extremism.33
An example of the authoritarian programme is the Korneuburg Oath 
of 1930, in which some branches of the Heimwehr voiced their objectives: 
“We want strong state leadership made up of leading figures of the ‘great 
estates’… We are battling the decline of our nation that is being ushered in 
31 E. HANISCH, Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 
20. Jahrhundert 1890–1990, Wien 1994, p. 294.
32 WILTSCHEGG, p. 304.
33 KLUGE, p. 39.
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by the Marxist class struggle and the liberal democratic system.”34 Despite 
rising popularity and the election of Prince E. R. Starhemberg in 1930 as the 
movement’s leader, the Heimwehr remained a divided and heterogeneous 
movement and was unable to have any fundamental influence on parliamen-
tary politics. And this remained so even despite the election of eight of its 
members to Parliament (Nationalrat) in the 1930 elections35 as representa-
tives of the Heimatblock, which was the political wing of the Heimwehr.
Unlike the Heimwehr the Austrian NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung remained a 
marginal party until the 1930s. In the parliamentary elections in 1930 it did 
not obtain the so-called basic mandate and therefore did not gain representa-
tion in the Nationalrat.
The civic coalition, the alliance between Catholic conservatives 
(Christian Social Party, CSP) and German nationalism in the form of the 
Greater German People’s Party, also proved unstable in the long term. Its 
demise was aided by the economic crisis that was already being felt in Aus-
tria in 1930. The government tried to combat the pressure of inflation with a 
restrictive monetary policy. Investments and government expenditures also 
decreased. The economic measures of the government and the National 
Bank led to a decline in exports and domestic demand, an increase in unem-
ployment, and intensified pressure on unions and workers’ organisations.36
However, it was the question of Anschluss that was instrumental in the de-
finitive demise of the coalition in the spring of 1932. After the largest Aus-
trian bank the Österreichische Creditanstalt collapsed in May 1931, the 
Austrian state was forced to request financial assistance from the League of 
Nations (a loan from Lausanne).37 France, which was supposed to provide 
some of the loan, made financial assistance conditional upon Austrian’s 
confirming that no Anschluss would be allowed for the next twenty years. 
The Greater German People´s Party was opposed to this and left the coali-
tion.
When the civic block in Austria broke up in the spring of 1932 there 
was a chance for returni to the solution that existed at the start of the repub-
34 The full oath is printed in L. KEREKES, Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie. 
Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr, Zürich 1966, p. 71.
35 The so called Heimatblock won 6.2% of the vote in the parliamentary elections. Statis-
tisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich. XII. Jg., Wien 1931, p. 210.
36 H. KERNBAUER, F. WEBER, Von der Inflation zur Depression. Österreichs Wirt-
schaft 1918–1934, in: E. TÁLOS (Hrsg.), Austrofaschismus, Beiträge über Politik, Öko-
nomie und Kultur 1934–1938, Wien 1988, pp. 1–31 (p. 20).
37 F. WEBER, Die Weltwirtschaftskrise und das Ende der Demokratie in Österreich, in:
E. FRÖSCHL, H. ZOITL (Hrsg.), Der 4. März 1933. Vom Verfassungs-bruch zur 
Diktatur.Beiträge zum wissenschaftlichen Symposium des Dr.-Karl-Renner-Instituts 
abgehalten am 28. Februar und 1. März 1984 in Wien, Wien 1984, pp. 37–67 (p. 59).
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lic the creation of a grand coalition.38 However, the leaders of the Christian 
Social Party decided to seek a coalition without the participation of the So-
cial Democrats. Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss therefore joined forces with 
the agricultural league the Landbund, which had nine seats in the federal 
assembly (Nationalrat), and the Heimatblock the party wing of the Heim-
wehr. Without their eight MPs, Dollfuss could not on 20 May 1932 have 
formed a government, but even then in Parliament the majority obtained 
was very small, with 83 votes, against the 82 votes of the Social Democratic 
Party and the Greater German People’s Party in the opposition.39 After a 
confrontation in the Nationalrat (in a dispute over invalid votes during a 
round of voting) and the abrupt resignation of three chairmen of the Na-
tionalrat on 4 March 1933 the government embarked on a path towards 
dictatorship, systematically limited the manoeuvring room of the Social 
Democrats, and strove to transform the Austrian political system into an 
authoritarian “Estates state”.
The End of Democracy 1930–1933: the Constitutional and Political 
Causes
The end stage of the existence of the Weimar Republic and the First Austri-
an Republic must be examined complexly to analyse the causes that led to 
the demise of democracy therein. While it is not the objective of this study 
to identify and describe all the causes that led to the end of democracy in the 
Weimar Republic and in Austria, and it is not the author’s intention to focus 
on the subject of foreign policy, it is nonetheless important to understand 
the European background to domestic political problems and in particular to 
the fact that in 1918–1919 Germany and Austria were viewed by their own 
populations as defeated states. The constraints imposed by the treaties of 
Versailles and Saint-Germain (as well as the reparations!) constituted an 
added long-term burden for the young republican systems and helped to 
destabilise the Weimar Republic and the First Austrian Republic. Below we 
look at the key (mainly) domestic political factors that significantly added to 
the crisis in democracy in 1930–1933. In some aspects Austria and Germa-
ny are comparable, in others areas we can find only similarities or even dif-
ferences.
38 For more on theis, see F. SCHAUSBERGER, Letzte Chanze für die Demokratie, die 
Bildung der Regierung Dollfuss I im Mai 1932. Bruch der österreichischen 
Proporzdemokratie, Wien, Köln,Weimar 1993.
39 G. SHEPHERD, Engelbert Dollfuß, Graz, Wien, Köln 1961, p. 118.
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The Constitutional and Institutional Levels
Article 48 of the Constitution (see above WRV) was the basic legal instru-
ment underpinning the parliamentary system in the Weimar Republic in 
1930–1933. In 1919 the Office of the President was conceived as the institu-
tion intended to guarantee constitutionality and to check the power of a 
strong Parliament. The significance of the position of the President in terms 
of politics and authority and in relation to the military force (Reichswehr)
was tailored to the figure of Friedrich Ebert. The extraordinary powers 
available to the President to use (and indeed used by the Social Democrat 
Ebert in 1923) were granted with a view to the President’s role in maintain-
ing stability and protecting democracy and the republic. In 1925, after 
Ebert’s death, Paul von Hindenburg, a Prussian aristocrat and an officer in 
the imperial military, was elected President in direct elections. Hindenburg 
saw his role as that of the “defender” of constitutional principles, but de 
facto he represented an authoritarian and ideological union with the con-
servative elites and the interest groups of east Prussian Junkers, who were 
strong supporters of the Monarchy. The architects of the Weimar Constitu-
tion had no idea that they were creating the conditions for a situation in 
which the President could be the main factor behind the transformation of 
the nature of the republican system.40
The authoritarian turn that was being prepared through backstage in-
trigue by General Kurt von Schleicher starting in late 1929 counted on the 
participation of the “presidential” Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. They made 
their move on 28 March 1930 after the collapse of the grand coalition of the 
Social Democrat Chancellor Hermann Müller.41 In July 1930 the Reichstag
for the first time rejected the emergency decrees of the Brüning cabinet that 
had been issued under Article 48 of the Constitution,42 which was followed 
by the dissolution of Parliament by President Hindenburg and the new elec-
tions in September 1930. In the elections the NSDAP surprisingly won 
18.3% of the votes and 107 seats (compared to 12 seats in 1928) and be-
came the second strongest party in the Reichstag.43 President Hindenburg 
was led to partially block the operations of the Parliament as a result of the 
unexpected rise of the NSDAP (and also the Communist Party, KPD), de-
spite initial hesitations to use emergency decrees as a “standard method of 
government”. Proposed laws for which the Government had no chance of 
obtaining a majority in Parliament were signed directly by the President and 
40 BRACHER, p. 51.
41 KOLB, p. 124.
42 For a tabular list of emergency decrees from 1930–1932, see MORAVCOVÁ, pp. 193–
194.
43 Ibidem, p. 171.
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in this way they entered into force. In its early stages the Reichstag was un-
able to put together a majority, thanks to the Social Democrats’ “tolerance” 
of the Government, and without it could not effectively oppose presidential 
decrees. And when it was ultimately able to do so (e.g. in 1930, and again in 
the summer of 1932), the Parliament was dissolved by the President (ac-
cording to Article 25 WRV).The mechanism of presidential cabinets (those 
of Chancellors Brüning, Papen and Schleicher) and the emergency legisla-
tion model resulted, in accordance with Article 48, in the weakening of the 
republic, unconstitutional action (the open violation of the Constitution by 
Franz von Papen on 20 July 1932 in the form of Government action against 
Prussia – so called Preussenschlag) and gradually significantly contributed 
to its demise.
In Austria, 4 March 1933 marked the decisive turn towards authori-
tarianism. Under the Second Austrian Republic, March 1933 was legally 
regarded as the turning point and end of parliamentary democracy. A formal 
error, where all three chairs of the Nationalrat resigned over a contested 
vote, helped Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss squeezed Parliament as a power 
player. The very next day after the elimination of Parliament Dollfuss an-
nounced at a meeting of farmers in Villach that “Parliament had paralysed 
itself”.44 Under the influence of the leaders of the Christian Social Party and 
with the tacit agreement of President Miklas and the support of the Heim-
wehr movement Dollfuss decided to adopt authoritarian rule.
In Austria the legal instrument employed by the government was not 
presidential decrees like in Weimar but the ‘Wartime Economic Empower-
ment Act’ of 24 July 1917,45 which gave the Government the authority to 
regenerate economic life, remedy economic damages and ensure the provi-
sion of supplies for the population throughout the duration of the extraordi-
nary circumstances that existed as a result of the war.46 After the First 
World War the act was incorporated into the Austrian legal system. It was 
used in 1931 and it was on the basis of this law that in October 1932 a de-
cree was issued to address the request of the Social Democrats to hold the 
directors of the bankrupt Creditanstalt accountable. The commentary on the 
act was prepared for the government by Robert Hecht, Dollfuss’s advisor: 
“The act generally grants the government enactment power, not just for 
certain, temporary decrees, because the bad times today are still the result 
44 For an interpretation of events, see G. BOTZ, Die Ausschaltung des Nationalrats im 
Urteil von Zeitgenossen und Historikern, in: G. BOTZ, Krisenzonen einer Demokratie. 
Gewalt, Streik und Konfliktunterdrückung in Österreich seit 1918, Frankfurt am Main,
New York 1987, pp. 119–121.
45 Kriegswirtschaftliches Ermächtigungsgesetz.
46 HUEMER, p. 139.
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of the war.”47 The empowerment act not only allowed the government to 
continue to make dramatic budget cuts but also give it the power to suppress 
political freedoms in the country. During the next 11 months (from March 
1933), the power of social democracy in Austria was weakened “step by 
step” by means of systematically planned government measures and spon-
taneous actions by the Heimwehr. Then, after the short civil war, on 12 Feb-
ruary 1934 the Austrian Social Democratic Party was banned. The trans-
formation of the political system culminated in the introduction of the reac-
tionary May Constitution in 1934. This new, forced Constitution legally 
consecrated the end of democracy and parliamentarism.
The NSDAP and Its Rise in the Elections in Germany and Austria
A fundamental question connected with Hitler’s ascent to the office of 
Chancellor in Germany and with the crisis and the end of parliamentarism 
in Austria in 1933 is what influence the rise of the Nazi Party had on the 
demise of German and Austrian democracy. The fact is that the vote gains 
to the NSDAP in the German elections that can still be regarded as free (if 
we do not count the elections in Germany in 1933) would never have been 
enough for the Nazi Party to form a majority government. Nevertheless, it 
was the mass popularity of Nazism among the German population that sig-
nificantly supported and de facto enabled the Nazis’ rise to power. While 
conservatives (including President Hindenburg) were initially distrustful of 
the Nazi movement, it was conservatives in top bureaucratic and military 
circles that wanted to take advantage of the popularity of the NSDAP, so on 
30 January 1933 they condoned the formation of a cabinet headed by Hitler 
as Chancellor.
Below we will analyse the causes of the rapid and recurrent success 
of the NSDAP in the German elections in 1930–1933. The voting behaviour 
of Germans in these elections can only be analysed through a complex ex-
amination of the situation. The Nazi Party could have benefited from a 
number of trends in society and the party system in the second half of the 
1920s which paved the way for the Party’s success.48 Although it clearly 
benefited from the economic crisis since 1929, unlike the KPD it did not 
become the party of the ‘unemployed’. The structure of the traditional social 
environment (R. M. Lepsius) was at risk of gradual erosion. Unlike the 
working-class and Catholic environments, which were relatively stable (the 
socio-moral environment), the civic Protestant camp became fragmented. 
From the start of the Weimar Republic it was obvious that traditional ties to 
political subjects were weakening and new cleavages were emerging that 
47 Ibidem, p. 144.
48 On the discussion of interpretations, see KOLB, p. 169.
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were generated by the war, revolution, hyperinflation, and the economic 
crisis. Some illustrative examples are the disputes that arose between those 
who profited from hyperinflation and those who lost, between the older and 
younger generations, between the working class and other workers, between 
the employed and the unemployed, and between men and women in the 
labour market.49
The afore-mentioned processes had a fundamental influence on the 
structure of the party system, political culture, and voter behaviour. The 
proportional parliamentary electoral system fragmented political groups.50
The formation of small centrist parties (Wirtschaftspartei, Landbund) that 
gained seats in the Parliament during the 1920s was a sign of the corrosion 
of the civic centre. Because there was no vote threshold for gaining seats in 
Parliament, parties got in that were radical or had diverse (even regional) 
interests and unstable voter support and were not suitable coalition partners 
for the established parties of the Weimar coalition (SPD, DDP, 
Zentrumspartei).51 However, what was instrumental for the rise of the 
NSDAP was the change in orientation of the DNVP (German National Peo-
ple’s Party). The DNVP was conservative in orientation and represented 
Prussian landowners and the nobility. It was usually part of the opposition, 
but when it was chaired by Count Kuno von Westarp on important votes in 
Parliament it joined other civic centrist and right-wing parties such as the 
DDP (the German Democratic Party), the DVP (the German People’s Par-
ty), Zentrum (the Catholic Party) and the BVP (the Bavarian People’s Par-
ty). In 1928 press magnate Alfred Hugenberg was appointed chair of the 
DNVP, and his leadership put the DNVP on a more nationalistic and au-
thoritarian course and thus clearly against the principles of a parliamentary 
republic.52 Thus, as the campaign against the Young plan (1929) showed, it 
became a party that promoted solutions similar to those of the NSDAP, but 
was perceived by voters as just a copy of the latter.
The parties in the centre and originally the right-wing conservative 
DNVP systematically lost votes in elections to the Reichstag between 1928 
and 1932.53 Some of the voters voted for the NSDAP instead of the DNVP. 
In 1932 the former voters of small centrist parties formed one-third of the
49 D. PEUKERT, Die Weimarer Republik. Krisenjahre der Klassischen Moderne,
Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 150.
50 MORAVCOVÁ, p. 46.
51 Zentrumpartei (Zentrum) was a centrist party with strong ties to the Catholic communi-
ty and it regularly formed part of democratic coalitions. Towards the end of the 1920s the 
rightist wing of the party gained in strength and Chancellor H. Brüning became the cen-
tral figure of the presidential cabinets.
52 MOMMSEN, p. 283. 
53 E.g., in the elections in 1928 the DNVP won 14.2% of the vote, but in July 1932 just 5.9%.
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increase of voter support for the NSDAP, supporters of liberal and German-
nationalist parties more than 10%, and former backers of the SPD 15% of 
the voters who changed their voting behaviour and chose to support the 
Nazis.54 An analysis of the voting behaviour of Germans in 1930–1932 in 
relation to their social status confirms that the NSDAP is rightly called the 
“universal protest party” (negative Volkspartei).55 Summing up the electoral 
gains of the NSDAP, especially in the parliamentary elections, we find that 
the party gained votes repeatedly at the expense of other political parties, 
and won the votes of non-voters and those who were voting for the first 
time. The NSDAP was the Volkspartei in the sense that it was able in the 
short term to mobilise voters from almost every social stratum. Although 
the middle classes were the main “support base” of the NSDAP, in numbers 
most of its voters were from the working class (almost 28%).56 It was a pro-
test party in the sense that it was unable to hold these voters for a long peri-
od of time, only for the short or medium term. Voter support for the 
NSDAP was therefore very unstable. This trend was apparent for instance in 
the parliamentary elections in November 1932, when the Nazis won “just” 
196 seats (a loss of 2 million votes!) compared to the July elections, when 
the NSDAP won 37,2% of the vote and 230 seats.57
Despite its successes in the elections in 1932 the NSDAP was una-
ble to form a majority government. Until January 1933 Hitler was unwilling 
to enter into any coalition. The fate of democracy in Germany thus to a cer-
tain degree depended on what went on with the presidential cabinets, the 
standpoint of President Hindenburg, and the strategy of the conservative 
governments of F. von Papen and K. von Schleicher (in alliance with the 
bureaucracy and the military) and their relationship to the NSDAP.
The drift away from democracy in Austria followed that in the 
Weimar Republic with a two-year delay in 1933–1934. Features of this shift 
in Austria included the important role played by conservatives in the dis-
mantling of parliamentarism (a feature it shared with Germany) and above 
all the confrontation between two extremist groups, Nazism and the Heim-
wehr movement, under the Dollfuss Government. Austrian Nazis only be-
gan to be a political factor in the spring of 1932. But from the mid-1920s 
they had been introducing the mentality, ideology, and the programmes of 
the German Nazis into Austria as well as their methods of combatting the 
Weimar Republic. The programme of the Austrian NSDAP-Hitlerbewegung 
offered its supporters in civic circles a number of attractive ideological 
54 J. W. FALTER, Hitlers Wähler, München 1991, pp. 365–366.
55 Ibidem, p. 364.
56 KOLB, p. 118.
57 Table of election results, see ibidem, p. 253.
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views. Anti-Semitism and German nationalism and a vision of uniting Aus-
tria and Germany were especially attractive to those Austrians that favoured 
the idea of a greater Germany. The middle classes were strongly represented 
in the ranks of voters and members of the NSDAP and they included em-
ployees, members of the free professions, and even small tradesmen, threat-
ened by competition from large businesses. In Austria the Nazis also found 
support among the minority Protestant voters. State officials formed a sepa-
rate group, as they did not feel that they were supported by the Greater 
German People’s Party or the Christian Social Party, and had been hit 
heavily by the austerity measures introduced by successive Austrian gov-
ernments during the economic crisis.58
The Nazi Party tirelessly called for Anschluss. Conversely, the con-
servative Christian Social Party defended Austria’s independence and there-
fore refused to enter into a coalition with the Nazis. Moreover, Dollfuss’s 
Catholicism was irreconcilable with Hitler’s irrational political behaviour 
and the anti-church and totalitarian ideology of the Nazis. In 1930 future 
minister Dollfuss declared: “For me the battle against Nazism is not so 
much a battle against a political party that is trying to attain power, for me 
it is a battle against an erroneous world view.”59 In 1930 the Nazi did not 
gain a single seat in the elections to the Nationalrat (federal Parliament), so 
it 1930–1932 could not serve as a potential coalition partner. However, it 
was successful at the local and regional levels. Before 4 March 1933 Hitler 
was still hoping that the Austrian NSDAP would be able (following the 
pattern in Weimar) to accede to power smoothly through parliamentary 
elections. However, with the elimination of parliament in March 1933 
Chancellor Dollfuss deprive the Austrian Nazis of the legal space for its 
ascent to power that in Germany they had been able to use successfully in 
the battle against the republic.
The question of the NSDAP’s influence in Austria should be viewed 
in the parallel context of developments in the Third Reich. Some authors, 
like Dieter Ross, claim60 that the electoral victory of the NSDAP in 
the Reich elections on 5 March 1933 had a fundamental influence on the 
decision of the Austrian cabinet on 7 March 1933 as to whether to embark 
on the path towards authoritarianism. At any rate, during the confrontation 
58 On the views of the Austrian bourgeoisie, see E. BRUCKMÜLLER, Das 
österreichische Bürgertum zwischen Monarchie und Republik, in: Zeitgeschichte, Jg. 20, 
Hf. 3–4, März-April 1993, pp. 60–83.
59 G. K. KINDERMANN, Hitlers Niederlage in Österreich. NS-Putsch, Kanzlermord und 
Österreichs Abwehrsieg 1934, Hamburg 1984, appendix with documentation, mainly pp. 
227–235.
60 D. ROSS, Hitler und Dollfuß. Die deutsche Österreich-Politik 1933–1934, Hamburg 
1966, pp. 19–21.
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between the Dollfuss regime and the Nazi Third Reich from the spring of 
1933 to the failed putsch in July 1934, the Austrian NSDAP-
Hitlerbewegung was a domestic political force. However, from the time the 
party was banned in June 1933 and stripped of the seats it had won in the 
regional assemblies (Landtag) the Nazis (especially the SA and the SS) op-
erated as an illegal terrorist movement with massive support from the Third 
Reich. As democratic structures and social democracy were destroyed (ini-
tially the government banned ‘just’ the social democratic Schutzbund) Doll-
fuss’s regime, with the support of the Heimwehr and the foreign policy 
backing of Fascist Italy, waged a successful battle against Nazism in the 
first stage in 1933–1934.61 It culminated in the defeat of the Nazi putsch on 
25 July 1934, during which, however, Chancellor Dollfuss was killed.
The End of the Republic – A Comparison of the Roles and Goals of the 
Conservative Forces
Having explained the main factors that drove the acceleration of electoral 
gains by the NSDAP, we can proceed to examine the conservative elites and 
their views in Germany and Austria in 1930–1933. We can identify the se-
quence in timing of three processes that led to the weakening and collapse 
of democracy in the two countries: the post-war crisis after 1918, the struc-
tural changes (latent crisis) during the 1920s (in the economy, politics, the 
political culture and ideology), and the economic and political crisis of 
1930–1933. The economic and social crisis brought on by the First World 
War was overcome in Germany by means of stabilisation of the currency 
and politics started in 1924 (under Stresemann era), while in Austria a par-
tial solution was provided by the loan that the country acquired in Geneva in 
1922. The republican regimes, while they survived the dramatic years of 
1918–1923, suffered a steady loss of legitimacy over the course of the 
1920s. Growing problems led the public to take an ever more sceptical view 
of parliamentarism and democracy. In Austria these feelings to some extent 
made themselves felt in the demand for Anschluss with the German Reich, 
which, it was supposed, would solve all the country’s economic difficulties. 
The third stage, when the economic crisis had set in, saw an increase in the 
activity of traditional conservative elites. The elites of the empire (parts of 
the middle classes, the bureaucracy, the church, the military, east Prussian 
Junkers, and industrialists), who had been in charge of the monarchical state 
in the time of the empire, were weakened by the revolution in 1918, but did 
not completely lose their position.
61 ???????, pp. 134–156.
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The conservative elites were looking for an authoritarian-reactionary 
anti-democratic option. In Austria the leadership of the Christian Social 
Party was inspired in its view by prelate and Chancellor Ignaz Seipel. He, 
for instance, criticised Parliament in a speech given in Tübingen on 16 July 
1929: “My criticism of pseudo-democracy is not directed against any one 
party, but against all the parties that have succumbed to democracy.”62 The 
perception of the role of political parties is the same among those who held 
power in both Germany and Austria during the first stage in the transfor-
mation from democracy to authoritarianism under Engelbert Dollfuss 
and Heinrich Brüning. Both Chancellors ignored the conditions and limits 
of political action in modern society and in this regard were intellectually 
stuck in the era of undeveloped parliamentarism that existed before.63 Re-
gardless of the political motives for their actions, they marginalised the sig-
nificance of political parties in favour of state bureaucracy and a technocrat-
ic government. The frequent government crises, unstable majorities, and the 
use of the obstructionist potential of political parties served as a logical ex-
ample of the contrast between ‘party politics’ and a stable state bureaucracy.
The difference between the situation in Germany and in Austria was 
that the public in the Weimar Republic was much more politicised and radi-
cal. The extreme political culture in Weimar made it impossible for the con-
servatives to implement their proposed solution of a ‘presidential regime’ 
and to win at least a decisive amount of public support for this system. 
Heinrich Brüning was a leading figure in the first stage because he was able 
to negotiate with the Social Democrats and other civic parties to secure tol-
erance for the system of emergency decrees. The departure from parliamen-
tary solutions instigated by Brüning made the government increasingly de-
pendent on the President, and ultimately in reality on the influential insiders 
around Paul von Hindenburg.64 Brüning thus had a hand in creating a sys-
tem in which intrigue in presidential circles was the decisive path to power, 
and in doing so he undermined his own position.
By systematically eliminating the Parliament (later also states’ gov-
ernments of Social Democracy)65 and the exclusion of the unions from de-
cision-making mechanisms H. Brüning and from 1932 F. von Papen created 
a power vacuum that they were unable to fill with any viable alternative.66
In the spring of 1932 the “presidential dictatorship” lost (through its own 
fault) its power base. The conservative military-bureaucratic group around 
62 I. SEIPEL, Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung, Wien, Leipzig 1930, p. 188.
63 KLUGE, p. 53.
64 MOMMSEN, p. 366.
65 A typical example was the toppling of the Prussian government in July 1932, the so-
called Preussenschlag.
66 PEUKERT, pp. 260–262.
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the President did not have the support of the masses, while Hitler did. The 
Nazis, however, also had difficulties. Although the NSDAP had demon-
strated itself to be a very successful movement, in the summer and autumn 
of 1932 it exhausted its voter support. It determinedly waited for an oppor-
tunity to attain power. In the second half of 1932 the conservative elites, 
which at that time were in the government, tried to find a way of integrating 
the totalitarian NSDAP and its support from the masses and including the 
armed SA units into the anti-parliamentary, authoritarian, and “presidential 
system”. On 30 January 1933 a group of presidential insiders headed by 
Papen, Hugenberg and General Blomberg, supported by the military and 
some high-ranking state bureaucrats, erroneously believed that they would 
be able to “tame” Hitler’s movement and use it to achieve the objectives of 
the conservative elites.67 The idea that all it would take to check the influ-
ence of the Nazi movement would be to surround Hitler within a cabinet 
majority of conservative ministers (Einrahmungskonzept) failed. Nine con-
servative ministers, headed by Deputy Chancellor Papen and the Minister of 
the Economy Hugenberg, were not enough to face down just three ministers 
(inclusive Hitler as Chancellor) of the NSDAP. Hitler’s totalitarian model of 
power was different; it did not address specific economic problems but in-
stead focused on securing the NSDAP a strong position within the state. For 
the quick culmination of his assumption of power it was enough for Hitler 
to attain the position of Chancellor and for NSDAP members to occupy the 
posts of minister of the interior in the Reich (Frick) and in Prussia (Göring) 
and thus to gain indirect control of the military.68
In Austria the fates of the conservative cabinets differed from devel-
opment in Germany in 1932–1933. With the failure of attempts to reach an 
agreement between the Social Democrats and Christian Social camps in the 
spring of 1932 Austria wasted an opportunity to return to the grand coalition 
that had existed in the early years of the republic.69 The right wing of politi-
cal Catholicism, in an effort to confront the Social Democrats (and later 
Nazism), forged cooperation with the extremist Heimwehr movement. 
However, the approach of Catholic social doctrine to the economy and so-
cial issues represented a “third way” in between materialist bolshevism and 
the uncompromising fascistic authoritarianism promoted by the Heimwehr.
However, E. Dollfuss and his successor K. von Schuschnigg were able to 
engage in some skilful manoeuvring within the bureaucratic police system 
67 The idea of “taming” Hitler (Zähmungskonzept, Einrahmungskonzept) foundered on 
the lack of readiness and radicalism of the totalitarian movement, which became fully 
apparent as soon as the appointment of Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor enabled the 
party to get a foot hold in the state apparatus.
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and managed to reinforce their own positions and prevent the Heimwehr 
movement from going unchecked. The conservatives came out stronger 
after two civil wars on 12 February 1934 (against the Social Democrats) 
and 25 July 1934 (against Nazism). Despite its significance in these con-
flicts the Heimwehr always remained the weaker partner. In Austria the 
NSDAP was temporarily knocked out after a confrontation in 1933–1934, 
and it only began gaining strength in 1936–1938 in connection with the 
altered situation in Europe and Italy and Austria turning their backs on the 
West. The conservatives thus retained their key position in Austria up until 
the Anschluss in 1938.
The Causes of the Crisis in Democracy in the Weimar Republic and 
Austria – Conclusion
We began our analysis of the crisis in democracy in Austria and Germany 
by examining the constitutional instruments that from a formal legal or qua-
si-legal perspective made it possible for anti-democratic forces to gain 
ground. In order to understand how democracy came to an end it is im-
portant to realise that the constitutional system in the Weimar Republic did 
not just fall “keel over” but in reality was systematically undermined by 
authoritarian and nationalist parties and conservative groups. The rise of 
these political subjects after 1930 was facilitated by the economic crisis and 
polarised political culture and by deficits in the Weimar Constitution. The 
absence of any election threshold for gaining entry into Parliament resulted 
in the disintegration of the party system. The preparation of referenda pro-
vided room for the introduction of radical populism (in particular Hitler, 
Hugenberg). The strong position of the President, equipped with powers 
under Article 48 of the WRV in the specific constellation of Paul von Hin-
denburg’s government rife with intrigue by conservative insiders (bureau-
crats, Junkers, Reichswehr) proved fatal to the republic. In reality, power 
was passed to Hitler on 30 January 1933 not by legal and parliamentary 
means, but (purely formally) by a narrow group of extra-constitutional forc-
es representing particular political and economic interests. Political parties 
(except for the NSDAP) and Parliament were entirely outside the game.70
In Austria the elites of the Christian Social Party were convinced of 
the need to rehabilitate the economy without any compromises with the 
Social Democrats. They portrayed the government crisis in March 1933 as a 
crisis of Parliament and set an authoritarian course towards the expulsion of 
the Social Democrats from political life. Despite short-term victory the Aus-
trian government de facto lost half of it political powers which in the longer 
70 BRACHER, p. 731.
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term of 1934–1938 it could have used to fight Nazism and the Third Reich 
and defend an independent Austria.
At the institutional level, the authoritarian path followed in Austria 
led in 1934 to the formal replacement of the republic with an “Estates 
states”. In Germany, where from February 1933 the situation developed 
steadily towards Nazi dictatorship, Hitler did not even try to do away with 
the basic constitutional institutions of the Weimar Republic. However, 
power was obtained and maintained until 1945 by parallel party and state 
structures of the Third Reich created by the Nazis.
The second problem was how political parties and voter preferences 
developed. The instability of the Weimar Republic was, alongside other 
factors, influenced by the instability of its governments. The strong polarisa-
tion in 1919–1920 led to a loss of votes for the parties in the Weimar coali-
tion and made it impossible to form a majority government that could stand 
clearly behind the republic and would be able to solve social problems and 
foreign policy issues relating to Germany. The crisis in the system, includ-
ing the ascent of Hitler in the office of Chancellor, was accompanied by the 
rise of the Nazi Party. Analysing the success of the NSDAP to date remains 
a key issue in connection with the demise of the Weimar Republic.
In Austria the situation was more complex. The conservative Chris-
tian Social Party, which from 1933 supported Dollfuss’s authoritarian turn, 
had no aim of becoming a mass fascist party. The newly established Patriot-
ic Front,71 which was supposed to be an integrative political group of the 
“Estates state”, never acquired dynamics typical of a totalitarian type of 
political party. The regime of Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg between 
1934 and 1938, instead of moving towards the declared “third way” be-
tween parliamentary democracy and fascist dictatorship, leaned towards a 
“Chancellor monocracy” propped up by state bureaucracy and the mili-
tary.72
The third factor influencing the political system and political culture 
of the Weimar Republic and the First Austrian Republic was an extra-
parliamentary group. The conservative and often anti-republican state bu-
reaucracy (and in Weimar also the military) managed to retain a strong posi-
tion in the state, despite the revolutionary changes in 1918–1919. In Germa-
ny and Austria the bureaucracy and the military had a fundamental impact 
on the Parliament, government and the President (Paul von Hindenburg) 
and contributed to the demise of democracy. On the other hand, it is also 
necessary to take into account the bottom up perspective. The society and 
71 I. BÄRNTHALER, Die Vaterländische Front. Geschichte und Organisation, Wien 
1971.
72 KLUGE, pp. 60–63, 94–95.
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political culture of the public were ideologically shaped by paramilitary 
organisations (Freikorps in Weimar, Heimwehr in Austria), veterans’ un-
ions (Stahlhelm), and partly by the literary community led by writers from 
the so-called conservative revolution (in Germany Ernst Jünger, Moeller 
van der Bruck; in Austria Othmar Spann).73
The increasing and more intensive use of “military methods” in ci-
vilian life and in politics, the glorification of war, and the militarisation of 
society in a situation of crisis and the culmination of social conflicts created 
very explosive conditions. This influenced the political culture, the way in 
which political objectives were asserted, the articulation of national patriot-
ism and finally also political campaigns.74 Political violence, in the form of 
murders, assassination attempts, and attempts at a putsch all occurred in the 
early stage of the Weimar Republic (1918–1923), and to a weaker extent 
can also be found in Austria in the interwar period.75 In Weimar, violence 
“for political reasons” (systematically used in particular by the NSDAP 
and the KPD) reached its peak during the campaigns for the parliament 
elections in 1932, in Austria during two short civil wars in February and 
July 1934.
To sup up, there were a number of features in common to the crisis 
in democracy in interwar Germany and Austria, such as the political polari-
sation of the right and the left and the very similar concepts for solving the 
economic crisis (budget and deflation policy) that were embraced by con-
servative circles in Weimar Germany (Brüning, Papen) and Austria (Doll-
fuss). A clear difference was the explosiveness and the greater radicalisation 
of anti-democratic movements in the Weimar Republic, features reflected in 
the nature of political culture in Weimar from the start of the 1920s and in 
the rapid weakening of democratic institutions between 1930 and 1932 and 
the relatively smooth transition to Nazi dictatorship starting in the spring of 
1933. Conservative Schuschnigg’s Austria, despite the destruction of basic 
democratic structures there in 1933–1934, was paradoxically the country to 
which waves of emigrants leaving Nazi Germany headed up until the An-
schluss in March 1938.
Abstract
The article compares the causes of the crisis in democracy in Austria and 
Germany between 1930 and 1934, focusing especially on the constitutional 
and political problems of both countries. The break with the parliamentary 
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system led in Germany to the emergence of the Nazi regime after Hitler 
became Chancellor in January 1933 and in Austria to the outbreak of civil 
war on February 12, 1934 and the formation of the authoritarian regime (the 
‘Estates state’) of Engelbert Dollfuss. Various factors caused the collapse of 
democracy in Weimar and the First Austrian Republic. Besides long-term 
processes such as economic instability and the Versailles system (which are 
not a part of this analysis), decisive mid-short-term factors behind the de-
mise of democratic structures included the weakness of the constitutional 
system and the political culture. The article concentrates on the following 
factors analysed: anti-democratic parties (NSDAP) and groups that after 
1918 had not completely lost their relative power (the military and industry 
in Germany; the high-ranking bureaucracy in Austria), and extra-
parliamentary groups such as the Freikorps and Heimwehr. The second part 
of the article analyses the role of conservative elites in the decisive trans-
formation phase from democracy to dictatorship after 1930 in Germany 
(presidential regime) and in Austria during the Dollfuss period from 1932 to 
1934.
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